Convicted Under A Ghost Law: The One Question Omotosho Never Answered

A new legal perspective on the appeal filed by Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader Nnamdi Kanu has emerged, with constitutional lawyer Christopher Chidera Esq. arguing that the entire appeal can be reduced to a single question which, according to him, was never conclusively answered during the trial.

In a public briefing note titled “The Simple Question at the Heart of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu’s Appeal,” Chidera stated that many commentaries surrounding the case have focused on peripheral issues while overlooking what he believes is the central constitutional challenge now before the Court of Appeal.

According to him, the appeal is not fundamentally about whether the repeal of the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 automatically invalidated the proceedings against Kanu. Neither, he argued, is it about whether a savings clause can preserve pending legal actions after a statute has been repealed.

Instead, the lawyer said the appeal focuses on a more fundamental constitutional requirement: whether there was a written law in force on November 20, 2025—the date Kanu was convicted—that defined the offences and prescribed the punishments upon which the conviction was based.

The Repeal That Sparked the Debate

Chidera explained that the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013, under which the charges against Kanu were originally brought, was repealed by the National Assembly through the enactment of the Terrorism Prevention and Prohibition Act 2022.

According to him, the repeal is a settled legislative fact and is not disputed by either the prosecution or the defence.

He noted that throughout the proceedings before the Federal High Court, Kanu repeatedly raised the issue and invited the trial court to formally take judicial notice of the repeal.

The lawyer claimed that the issue was specifically brought before the court during proceedings held on October 23 and November 4, 5, 7 and 20, 2025.

He argued that under Section 122 of the Evidence Act, courts are required to take judicial notice of laws in force in Nigeria, including amendments, enactments and repeals passed by the National Assembly.

According to him, because the repeal was a matter of public law, no additional evidence was required before the court could recognize it.

However, Chidera alleged that rather than formally taking judicial notice of the repeal, the court proceeded on an “assuming without conceding” basis, thereby avoiding a direct determination of the legal consequences of the repeal.

Why the Savings Clause Is Not the Main Issue

One of the key points highlighted in the briefing is that Kanu’s appeal does not challenge the validity of the savings clause contained in Section 98(3) of the Terrorism Prevention and Prohibition Act 2022.

According to Chidera, there appears to be broad agreement that the savings provision preserved ongoing proceedings, rights, liabilities and obligations that arose before the repeal of the earlier legislation.

He also cited Section 6 of the Interpretation Act, which generally protects pending proceedings from being extinguished simply because a statute has been repealed.

The lawyer therefore dismissed suggestions that the appeal is based on the argument that the repeal automatically terminated the prosecution.

“The case survived repeal,” he stated.

“That is not the issue. The appeal accepts that pending proceedings may continue where preserved by law.”

A Constitutional Distinction

According to Chidera, the mistake many observers make is assuming that preserving a proceeding automatically answers the question of what law authorizes a conviction.

He argued that a savings clause and a criminal statute perform entirely different legal functions.

While a savings clause may preserve a prosecution, he said it does not itself define criminal conduct or prescribe punishment.

“A savings clause keeps the machinery of a case running,” he explained.

“But it is not the criminal law itself. It does not tell the court what conduct constitutes an offence, nor does it prescribe the punishment that follows a conviction.”

According to him, that distinction becomes crucial when viewed through the lens of constitutional requirements governing criminal trials.

Reliance on Section 36(12) of the Constitution

The lawyer anchored his argument on Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the punishment prescribed in a written law.

He argued that the constitutional provision requires courts to identify the exact written law that was in force at the time of conviction.

According to Chidera, because the 2013 terrorism law had already been repealed before judgment was delivered on November 20, 2025, the court was required to identify the law that remained operative and under which the conviction could legally stand.

He maintained that simply pointing to the existence of a savings clause does not satisfy the constitutional requirement.

“The Constitution does not say a person may be convicted because a proceeding survived,” he argued.

“It says the offence must be defined and the punishment prescribed in a written law.”

The Question Chidera Says Was Never Answered

Throughout the briefing, Chidera repeatedly returned to what he described as the one question that remained unanswered during the trial.

According to him, Kanu consistently challenged the court to identify the written law in force on the date of conviction that authorized the offences and punishments contained in the judgment.

The lawyer argued that while the court discussed the effect of repeal and relied on transitional provisions preserving the proceedings, it never clearly identified the operative statutory provisions that satisfied Section 36(12) of the Constitution.

For this reason, he believes the issue now lies squarely before the Court of Appeal.

What the Court of Appeal Must Decide

According to Chidera, the appellate court's task is straightforward.

He said the Court of Appeal must determine whether there was a written law in force on November 20, 2025, that defined the offences and prescribed the punishments for which Kanu was convicted.

If the answer is yes, the court can identify that law and explain why the conviction remains valid.

However, if no such law can be identified, Chidera argues that the court will have to consider the constitutional consequences of that finding.

He noted that the decision could have implications beyond Kanu’s case, particularly in clarifying how Nigerian courts should approach convictions arising from statutes that have been repealed and replaced by subsequent legislation.

A Debate Reduced to One Sentence

For all the legal arguments, statutory provisions and constitutional interpretations involved, Chidera insists that the appeal ultimately comes down to a single question.

Not whether the case survived repeal.

Not whether a savings clause preserved ongoing proceedings.

Not whether liabilities continued after the old law was repealed.

But whether there was a written law in force on November 20, 2025, that legally authorized the conviction of Nnamdi Kanu.

According to the lawyer, that question remains the foundation of the appeal and one that the Court of Appeal will inevitably have to answer as it considers the next chapter in one of Nigeria’s most closely watched legal battles.